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Abstract 
 
While conditionality is a frequently discussed topic among policy-makers and cooperating 
partners when it comes to social cash transfers, less attention has been paid to the views of 
the general public and beneficiaries in low-income countries. Using qualitative, survey and 
experimental evidence from Zambia, this study contrasts the perceptions of beneficiaries and 
the broader public with those of policy-makers and assesses the factors that influence 
choices about imposing conditionality. As long as conditionality is not so rigorously enforced 
that it leads to greater tension, conditionality meets the interests of policy-makers, the 
general public and beneficiaries alike, exerting the necessary control for transfer givers and 
the guidance for transfer recipients. The experiment, however, also demonstrates that 
conditionality preferences are neither homogeneous nor static and are likely to change with 
more exposure to social cash transfers and conditionality. 
 
Key words: conditionality, social cash transfers, political economy, empowerment 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Policy makers struggle with whether or not to opt for conditionality in a social cash transfer 
program.  Conditionality is argued to make a social cash transfer politically more attractive 
because conditions direct household spending toward the intended use and counterpart 
action by households as well as greater provision of services by government. On the other 
hand conditionality can easily diminish the political support of those who are being 
conditioned because they face higher transaction costs, are forced to adopt a behavior that is 
not their first preference or are demotivated by the control and lack of trust that conditionality 
signals.  
 
Although both advocates and opponents agree that there are political economy benefits of 
conditionality, a closer scrutiny of the evidence shows that only anecdotal evidence supports 
this argument (Schüring 2010). We have scarce information about the preferences of policy-
makers and understand even less to what extent these preferences coincide with the 
preferences of urban and rural voters or more decentralized governance structures such as 
communities and beneficiaries themselves. As policies are only sustained if they enjoy 
decision-makers’ support, it is important to understand the political potential and/or cost of 
conditionality and assess the factors that motivate decision-makers at different levels to opt 
for or against 
  
In order to enlarge the body of evidence, this paper studies conditionality preferences more 
intensively and explores their political potential. The different arguments that are advanced 
with respect to the political economy of conditionality (Section 2) are presented. The paper 
then introduces the methodology that was employed to elicit people’s conditionality 
preferences and choices, ranging from interviews and surveys to community experiments 
(Section 3). Section 4 presents the views of decision-makers, followed by stated preferences 
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of urban respondents (Section 5), revealed preferences of rural respondents (Section 6), 
conditionality decisions of rural communities (Section 7) and opinions of (potential) 
beneficiaries themselves (Section 8). Drawing on this mix of preferences, Section 9 
concludes with an assessment of the political potential of conditionality.  
2. THEORY 
2.1 Preferences for conditioning 
Decision-makers may prefer conditionality because they fear that without the imposition of 
conditions, households might take sub-optimal decisions from a personal and a societal 
perspective (Das, Do et al. 2005; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006; de Janvry and Sadoulet 
2006; Bastagli 2008; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Schüring 2010). For example, households 
might not invest sufficiently in the conditioned good and service if they have access to 
imperfect information, if individuals with greater authority within the household do not behave 
completely altruistically vis-à-vis other household members (age and gender hierarchies), if 
they are myopic in their choices or particularly risk-averse. Households also seldom have all 
the information to accurately factor in the positive spill-over effects of education and health 
decisions or the social costs of underinvestment in these areas. Conditionality could 
therefore help to orient individuals’ choices toward an optimum for the recipient as well as 
society. 
 
Even if households already invest at an optimal level, conditionality can still be appealing to 
decision-makers because it buys political support for welfare programs, which tend to be 
politically unpopular. Conditionality can transform the image of a transfer going to an 
“undeserving” individual to an individual who has earned support through his/her counterpart 
action (Hickey 2006). According to Lindert and Vincensini (2009), this appeal applies to the 
political right as well as to the political left with the Right appreciating conditionality as a 
contractual arrangement with clear obligations attached and the Left viewing conditionality as 
a basic right.  
 
By adding requirements to the transfer, the conditionality introduces an element of control 
preventing households from consuming “demerit” goods. It also introduces an element of 
reciprocity, asking the individual to actively graduate out of poverty, to reduce the risk of 
falling into poverty again and to prevent the coming generation being equally dependent on 
social welfare. In this way, conditionality can be seen to guarantee for fair burden-sharing 
within society across generations. In addition, conditionality can have an important signaling 
effect in terms of the performance of government. By only continuing support if conditions are 
met, conditionality assists decision-makers in demonstrating success long before the actual 
impact evaluation has been carried out. This might be particularly crucial in countries which 
are donor dependent and where donors demand observable measures of performance 
usually fairly quickly as they are equally accountable to taxpayers in their respective 
countries (Das, Do et al. 2005).  
 
Consequently, without looking at the administrative challenges attached to the management 
of conditionality, conditionality appears to have apriori significant political appeal. 
2.2 Preferences for being conditioned 
While some authors have argued that conditionality can actually empower recipients by 
turning the welfare payment into a contractual agreement and treating the recipient as a 
partner (Cohen and Franco 2006; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006; de la Brière and Rawlings 
2006) or by increasing the negotiation power of women in the household (Martinelli and 
Parker 2003), most authors stress the patronizing and disempowering nature of conditionality 
(Schubert and Slater 2006; Freeland 2007; Standing 2007; Veit-Wilson 2009). Beneficiaries 
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might feel demotivated by the extra nudge from government, they might perceive 
conditionality as a lack of trust (Fehr and Gächter 2001; Sliwka 2007; Frey 2008; Kremer, 
Miguel et al. 2009) and they might attain a higher level of welfare without conditionality being 
attached to the transfer. 
 
Critics furthermore highlight the possibility that conditionality might reinforce traditional 
gender roles and responsibilities (Molyneux 2006; Bradshaw 2008), or that it could lead to 
higher costs for the beneficiary (Coady, Perez et al. 2005) and that eventually recipients risk 
being screened out where they cannot comply with the conditions. These arguments suggest 
that conditionality would not be the preferred choice of beneficiaries, in particular where other 
factors prevent beneficiary households accessing the conditioned services such as 
unavailability, irregularity or low quality of respective health and education services 
(Barrientos and de Jong 2006; Handa and Davis 2006). 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Experiment with rural communities 
Community experiments were conducted in 25 different communities, with a pre-test being 
carried out in one additional community (see table 1 for the overall set-up of the experiment). 
The 25 communities were randomly selected through stratified cluster sampling from the list 
of treatment and control communities of a social cash transfer (SCT) pilot in Monze district, 
Zambia, which targets extremely poor households with no or limited labor capacity.  We 
clustered communities by their SCT status to test the impact of prior exposure to SCT on 
outcomes: 15 communities on the SCT pilot and 10 control locations, which had not been 
integrated into the SCT programme, were selected. 
 
In each study location, two groups of 10 individuals each participated in the experiment. 
Community members were randomly selected from a pool of volunteers. Information, 
collected through a pre-survey, helped to assign each member one of the three wealth 
categories – “very poor”, “poor” and “better off”. Effort was made to ensure that there was 
representation from each of these strata in every group. Specifically, 3, 4, and 3 community 
members were randomly selected for each group from the “very poor”, “poor” and “better off” 
categories respectively. 
 
There were two different treatment conditions in the experiment, which were randomly 
allocated to different communities. Every individual could only participate in one of the two 
treatment conditions. For treatment condition 1, group members made decisions for 
members of their own group including themselves while for treatment condition 2, group 
members made decisions for members of the second group playing in the community. For 
each of these treatment conditions, two different rounds were played: the individual round 
that allowed each participant to make decisions in private and a second round where the 
group decided jointly.  
 
In the first round, participants individually distributed 20 tokens, each worth ZMK 50,000 
(~US$ 10) with the overall objective of alleviating poverty. For every group member of either 
their own or the other group in the community, the giver had to decide 1) whether to give any 
tokens, 2) how many to give, 3) whether to make the transfer conditional, and 4) which 
condition to choose out of an education, growth monitoring, vaccination, training and 
community work condition. Most of the participants knew each other; in fact only 3% claimed 
not to really know the other person. In order to make sure that all group members had at 
least some basic information about the other participants, every participant was asked to 
introduce him- or herself before the initial instructions were given. 
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After all individuals had made their choices concerning the distribution of tokens and 
conditionality, they were interviewed about their motives for doing so. For the second round 
of the experiment, all group members decided jointly on how to allocate a total of ZMK 
10,000,000 to either their own group members (treatment condition 1) or the members of the 
other group in the community (treatment condition 2). After the group allocation, each group 
member was again interviewed individually about his/her satisfaction with the group 
outcome.  
 
Table 1: Set-up of the experiment (experiment locations, treatment conditions & experiment rounds) 
 
Source: Author’s illustration 
 
For the decision-making process to be as close to reality as possible there was a monetary 
gain attached. Each token-receiving individual was awarded 1% of the value of the tokens 
received (i.e. ZMK 500 for each ZMK 50,000 token received). In order to make sure that 
participants understood that there was a cost attached to complying with conditionality, every 
condition had a separate cost, which was deducted from the real monetary gain, using a 
conversion factor of 1:100.1 For the education condition, ZMK 20,000 was deducted per child 
aged 5 years. This was roughly the price that households had to pay for unofficial school 
fees. For the training condition, a flat rate of ZMK 20,000 was subtracted as a training fee. 
For the vaccination condition as well as the growth monitoring condition, ZMK 10,000 was 
taken for every child below 5 years in order to cater for transport costs to the nearest health 
post. For the community work condition, no money was deducted but it was explained that 
community work would demand time and energy. If different participants placed the same 
conditionality on the same recipient, the costs were only deducted once. 
3.2 Political attitude surveys & interviews 
In order to test people’s attitudes towards poverty, government assistance and conditionality, 
a survey was administered among the general urban population, students as well as among 
rural participants. 435 people were interviewed in public places in Lusaka. Markets, mini-bus 
and intercity-bus stops and shopping malls were selected as interview sites in order to 
maximize the likelihood of encountering people of different backgrounds. Enumerators were  
told to ensure some variation in respondents, approaching people of different gender, age 
and poverty status. The structure of the questionnaire was partly inspired by the world value 
survey as well as the questions asked by Graham (2002) on public attitudes towards social 
welfare. 
 
In order to get a better idea about the attitudes of the next generation of decision-makers, we 
conducted a survey with university students, which resembled the survey for the urban 
participants. This allowed us to contrast preferences of present and future policy-makers and 
see how they might possibly change over time. 1,000 questionnaires were distributed across 
                                                 
1 A detailed description of the experiment can be requested from the author from 
esther.schuering@maastrichtuniversity.nl  
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all departments of University of Zambia (UNZA). Selected lecturers were asked to administer 
the questionnaires to students in their respective classes. All together 396 questionnaires 
were returned.  
 
With the aim to avoid an exclusive urban focus, we also interviewed the 500 experiment 
participants from rural communities about their attitudes towards poverty, government 
assistance and conditionality. 
 
Interviews were conducted with 44 policy-makers at national and local level to elicit their 
opinions about conditionality.  
3.3 Beneficiary survey 
All together 216 beneficiaries from 17 different communities in Monze district were 
interviewed. The choice of communities was determined by the random selection of locations 
for the community experiments. The information about the beneficiary interviews was 
communicated at a community meeting which was used to inform the community about all 
the research activities taking place. Beneficiaries not attending the meeting were furthermore 
informed by members of the Community Welfare Assistance Committee. At least 6 
beneficiaries were interviewed in each community. Next to their thoughts about conditionality, 
beneficiaries were interviewed about their awareness of any form of conditionality in the SCT 
scheme as well as about their preferences and opinions on a range of different topics. 
4. CONDITIONALITY PREFERENCES OF POLICY-MAKERS 
4.1 Present policy-makers 
Altogether 68% of 44 interviewed civil servants at central, provincial and district level as well 
as Members of Parliament2 opted for conditionality, with preferences strongest among civil 
servants across different Ministries at district and provincial level (see figure 1). The only 
group of respondents with no majority favouring conditionality is the Ministry of Community 
Development of Social Services which is in charge of social protection and poverty alleviation 
programs (50% in favour of conditionality).  
 
Figure 1: Opinion of different policy-makers about the necessity of conditionality 
 
Source: Qualitative interviews 
 
                                                 
2 MCDSS includes all staff members at national, provincial and district level of the Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services. Other Ministries includes staff from Ministries other than MCDSS at national 
and district level. District and provincial staff aggregates civil servants across different Ministries. Politicians 
include MPs and one person running for MP.  
N= 14 N= 15 N= 3
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While there seemed to be a general inclination towards conditionality, the rationale for this 
view varied across stakeholder groups. The need to guide as well as the encouragement to 
take initiative appeared to be more prevalent among staff members at different levels of 
MCDSS and other ministries, while the urge to demonstrate impact mattered most for 
Members of Parliament (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Opinion of different policy-makers about the rationale for conditionality 
 
Source: Qualitative interviews 
 
In order to better understand the ambiguity around conditionality for MCDSS and its potential 
for politicians, we now take a closer look at respondents’ rationale for (not) conditioning. 
MCDSS staff opposed to conditionality were concerned that conditionality could drive up 
costs, overtax government capacity and weaken people’s confidence in government’s ability 
to deliver. There was also concern that conditionality would not be compatible with the 
MCDSS mandate of rendering assistance unconditionally to those who qualified for support. 
MCDSS staff members in favour of conditionality saw the need for further guidance of 
beneficiaries and to avoid nurturing households’ belief that government was in charge of 
everything and citizens didn’t have to take any responsibility.  
 
Considering that politicians’ primary interest should be that the money reaches the people 
and has an impact, conditionality is attractive as it ensures a pre-determined outcome and 
flags the program as progressive and developmental. A number of respondents across all 
groups referred to politicians’ concerns with their public image to argue that politicians would 
not be supportive of conditionality. They said that most politicians in their endeavour to win 
votes would not like programs that are restricted to a particular group in communities and / or 
lead to a high exclusion rate of qualifying people. 
 
Not only within MCDSS and among politicians were opinions more nuanced than the 
averages might suggest. The majority of interview partners did not view conditionality as an 
‘either or’ question but looked more carefully at the conditions under which conditionality 
would be appropriate such as the transfer amount, the percentage of the transfer being 
conditioned, the target group and objective of the program, the management capacity of the 
country and the nature of conditionality.  
4.2 Future policy-makers 
About 86% of students were in favour of conditioning transfers, with a higher and statistically 
significant probability of conditioning the transfers among female and richer students. 
Consequently, the preference trend among present and future policy-makers for 
conditionality is similar. Even if preferences of students might change when they get more 
information about the target group and are faced with trade-offs of conditionality choices, it is 
not likely for the trend to be reversed. 
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Motives behind conditionality choices are similar between students and policy-makers. Most 
students in favor of conditionality argued that conditionality would avoid misuse and laziness 
on the part of the recipients, create more accountability and instill a sense of responsibility. 
Some reasoned that everybody in society has to work and that nothing is provided for free, 
regarding conditionality in social cash transfers as a payback mechanism to the nation. 
Conditionality was viewed either as a control or a support mechanism: some respondents 
were only interested in having beneficiaries demonstrate improvement or at least the 
intention to improve; others believed in the potential of conditionality to help beneficiaries 
develop, be empowered and assist them to sustain their efforts. People opposed to 
conditionality argued that beneficiaries know best what is good for them and that government 
services should be free and accessible to all. One respondent even stressed that “conditions 
do not show sympathy or willingness to help.” Critics cautioned that conditions might exclude 
people who need support and they were concerned that the poor would not be able to handle 
conditions anyhow.   
5. CONDITIONALITY PREFERENCES OF URBAN PARTICIPANTS 
The majority of urban participants in the public attitude survey (71%) opted for conditionality 
in SCT programs. Also among those who indicated that they had voted in the last election, a 
majority of 70% preferred conditional cash transfers. We can therefore see that conditionality 
not only mirrors decision-makers preferences but would also help politicians in favour of 
conditionality get more political support. The reasons as to why urban participants were 
generally more supportive of conditionality, match the reasons that were provided by 
students.  
 
Given that there is variability in conditionality choices, it is interesting to see whom politicians 
would have to target if they were in favour of conditionality. In order to explore the impact of 
different explanatory factors for conditionality choices such as background characteristics 
and values of respondents, we estimate the following logit model: 
 
Prob (Yi = 1) = βo + β1xi+ ui 
 
with Prob (Yi = 1) = probability of respondent i to condition the transfer and xi = attitudes and 
characteristics of respondent i 
 
Table 2: Logit regression on determinants for conditioning transfers among the urban public 
Dependent variable: Categorical variable on whether transfer was conditioned 
Explanatory variables Coefficients 
Respondent is very poor -1.67  **  
Respondent is poor -0.32   
Respondent is in the middle-income bracket -0.54   
Respondent has not completed any education -1.98 *** 
Respondent has completed primary education 0.46   
Respondent has completed lower secondary -0.82 * 
Respondent has completed upper secondary -0.18   
Respondent agrees that incomes should be made more equal -0.58 * 
Respondent thinks that poverty is due to a lack of initiative of the poor -0.42   
Respondent prefers targeting children -0.77 * 
      
Constant 2.04 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.10   
N 219   
* 10% significance level ** 5% significance level *** 1% significance level 
Source: Urban attitude survey 
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Anyone not characterizing him/herself as rich3 is less likely to condition the transfer (see 
table 2). Having an education, in particular the combination of having a tertiary education and 
being rich increases the likelihood of conditioning. Poorer respondents might be more 
sensitive to the cost and time implications of conditioning or they might put more thought to 
the decision because they could be affected by it themselves. Those with a higher education 
might have greater expectations of what recipients should do with the money, displaying a 
more paternalistic attitude. Respondents who think that incomes should be made more equal 
in society and whose priority target group would be children, are less inclined to condition. 
This could be related to the fact that those who stress the need for more equality and less 
competition view a public transfer as an unconditional right and children as deserving 
unconditional support. We can conclude that richer, better educated and more liberal voters 
would support conditionality and that the target group indeed plays a role as the stakeholder 
interviews suggested. 
6. CONDITIONALITY PREFERENCES OF RURAL PARTICIPANTS 
We now draw on the experimental evidence from rural Zambia to get a better understanding 
of how people act when choices have real implications. 
6.1 Conditionality preferences & choices 
In the experiment participants had to decide whether they wanted to condition the transfer 
and if so, what kind of conditionality they wanted to choose. About 69% of all transfers were 
conditioned despite the fact that a condition in the experiment translated into a transfer 
reduction for the respective recipient. If we disaggregate conditionality decisions by 
community status and treatment condition, we can see variance (see table 3). The difference 
between individuals with treatment condition 1 in SCT-communities and individuals with 
treatment condition 1 in non-SCT communities is the greatest, hinting at a possible effect of 
prior exposure to SCT on the decision to condition.  
 
Table 3: Percentage of transfers being conditioned, by community status and treatment condition 
SCT communities Non-SCT communities 
Treatment 
condition 1 
Treatment 
condition 2 
Treatment 
condition 1 
Treatment 
condition 2 
58% 75% 80% 64% 
N 1200 N 1509 N 753 N 958 
Source: Individual allocation round (experiment) 
 
Surprising is the opposite trend within treatment conditions when compared across SCT and 
non-SCT communities. One possible explanation could be that conditionality in communities 
without exposure to SCT was more strongly perceived as guidance while in communities with 
prior exposure it could also been perceived as control or an unnecessary obligation. This 
would explain the opposite trends between treatment conditions, as positive effects are likely 
to be reinforced and negative effects avoided for members of one’s own group. For members 
of the other group, there might be a stronger desire to control rather than to guide.  
 
The majority (in 69% of all transfers) decided to place one condition out of the five 
conditionality options. 17% placed two conditions. The negligibly small percentage of people 
                                                 
3 Respondents were asked to classify themselves as very poor, poor, middle, upper middle, rich, upper rich. 194 
respondents classified themselves as very poor, 33 as poor, 102 as middle-income, 6 as upper-middle, 6 as rich 
and 9 as very rich. For the analysis, the upper middle, rich and upper rich categories were collapsed. 
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voting for all 5 conditions (0.2%) is probably due to the fact that five conditions were judged 
too much for the transfer amount given. Taking the perspective of the recipient, we observe 
that the majority of participants ended up receiving more than 1 condition. Aggregating 
conditions that individuals received from other participants, we see that individuals received 
on average 3.4 conditions of different types (figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: Number of conditions of varying kinds that participants received from other participants 
 
Source: Survey I (experiment) 
 
Education was the preferred conditionality. Most transfers (60%) were conditional on 
education, followed by conditions in health (22% for growth monitoring and 18% for 
vaccinations) and then public works (17%). The training condition was least used (11%).  
6.2 Rationale for conditionality preferences 
Stated individual motives 
The official reason most often mentioned (in more than half of all cases) for conditioning was 
“to guide the beneficiary,” followed by “to avoid abuse” in about one third of all cases and 
“avoid laziness” in about 16% of all transfers (figure 4). This resembles the reasons that were 
given by voters as well as present and potentially future decision-makers. 
 
Figure 4: Motives behind conditioning the transfer (multiple answers were allowed) 
 
Source: Survey I (experiment) 
 
Reasons for not conditioning were primarily that it was considered unnecessary in about two 
thirds of all cases, too costly for the beneficiary in 18% of all cases and too much work in 6% 
of all cases. Infrastructure and quality service considerations as well as the fear of being 
patronizing were all at 1% and below and therefore did not figure as prominently as the 
literature suggests (figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Motives behind not conditioning the transfer (multiple answers were allowed) 
 
Source: Survey I (experiment) 
 
Keeping in mind that participants might have been reluctant to reveal their true motives and 
state that they considered to be politically correct or expected of them, we now analyze the 
motives participants revealed through the experiment.   
Revealed individual motives 
The most intuitive appeal of conditionality to a central government or decentralized decision-
making body such as a community is the possibility to control behavior of those who enjoy 
low levels of trust and in this way solve the principal-agent problem. We have seen in the 
attitude survey that people who favored conditionality had low expectations of those 
receiving the transfer. They believed that without the conditionality, recipients would not be 
able or willing to improve their standard of living. We therefore expect individuals with low 
levels of trust to condition more. 
 
We would also expect that fewer conditions are placed on the unproductive and very poor, 
due to the consideration that conditionality presents a cost to beneficiaries. It is probable that 
the poor and possibly also women as givers are more sensitive to the costs of conditionality 
as givers. They are the ones most affected by it, either by risking exclusion from the program 
or having to bear the (in)direct costs of compliance. Also individuals regarding social 
transfers as a duty of the community or government might be more reluctant to use 
conditionality as illustrated by the public attitude survey. 
 
We estimate the following logit model, running different regressions by community status 
(SCT vs. non-SCT) and treatment condition (condition 1 vs. condition 2): 
 
Prob (Yij =1) = βo + β1xTj + β2xi + β3xi + uii 
 
with Prob (Yij =1) = probability that giver i conditions the transfer for recipient j, and xTi = trust 
of the giver i, xi = attitude and background characteristics of giver i and xj = background 
characteristics of recipient j 
 
Trust appears to be an important factor in conditionality decisions for individuals in SCT as 
well as for individuals from non-SCT communities, confirming the theory that conditionality is 
a tool to control uncertain behavior (table 4). Mistrust vis-à-vis the community as well as 
mistrust of people in general translates into a higher probability of conditioning the transfer. 
This effect is greatest in groups from non-SCT communities with treatment condition 2. This 
seems reasonable as more experience – at least when it is positive – and more direct 
contact and interaction translate into greater comfort and lower levels of mistrust. Givers who 
are convinced of a certain fairness in the community are less mistrustful and also less likely 
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to condition the transfer. Assuming that trust levels are higher among people who know each 
other, we also included a proximity variable in the regression. Transfers going to those who 
the giver knows (very) well are less conditioned, at least in SCT community groups with 
treatment condition 1.4  
 
Table 4: Logit regression on the determinants of individual conditionality choices 
Dependent variable: Categorical variable on whether transfer was conditioned 
Explanatory variables 
 On SCT   Off SCT  
TC1 TC2 TC1 TC2 
Coefficients 
Giver agrees that the community cannot be trusted 0.97 *** 0.12   1.18 *** 2.40 ***
Giver completely disagrees that overall people can be 
trusted 0.19   1.05 *** 1.73   2.19 ** 
Giver knows the recipient well -0.13 *** 0.07   -0.12   -0.13 * 
Giver thinks that overall people try to be fair rather than to 
exploit others -0.35 *** -0.39 *** -0.81 *** -0.23   
Progressive giver with the very poor receiving more than 
through equal distribution -0.36 ** -0.26 * 0.08   -0.84 ***
Giver agrees with helping people who cannot do anything in 
return 0.71 *** -0.69 *** 1.41 *** 0.29   
Giver completely agrees that the community is responsible 
for the poor 0.68 *** 0.56 *** -0.27   -0.38   
Giver agrees that the government is responsible for the poor -0.66 *** -1.59 *** 0.15   -2.10 ***
Giver completely agrees that the family is responsible for the 
poor 0.09   -0.49 *** -0.97 *** -0.44 ***
Gender giver (male=0, female=1) -0.35 ** -0.49 *** -0.61 ** 0.47 ** 
Very poor giver -0.39 ** 0.18   -0.11   -0.44 * 
Poor giver -0.36 ** 0.01   0.49 * 0.06   
Age giver 0.01 ** 0.01 ** -0.01   0.02 ***
Important position in the community of giver 0.16   -0.24   0.09   0.57 ***
Very poor recipient 0.17   0.32  *  0.13   0.08   
Poor recipient 0.22   0.12   0.55 ** -0.15   
Age recipient 0.01   -0.01   0.00   0.00   
Important position in the community of recipient -0.15   0.06   0.22   -0.33 * 
Number of 0-5 in recipient household 0.13 *** -0.02   0.18   0.11   
Recipient is too old/sick to work 0.21   -0.23   -1.50 ** -0.23   
              
Constant -0.06   3.18 *** 1.79 * 1.99   
Pseudo R2 0.07   0.07   0.15   0.16   
N 1169   1320   709   873   
* 10% significance level ** 5% significance level *** 1% significance level 
Source: Pre-survey, Individual allocation round, Survey II (Experiment) 
 
Progressive givers5 as well as those who thought that the government and/or family are 
responsible for taking care of the poor, were less inclined to condition cash transfers. This 
could mean that they had more faith in recipients’ capacity to spend the money according to 
their priority needs in the case of progressive givers and / or that they viewed support from 
the government and family as an entitlement, which is supposed to be given without any 
conditions attached. Altruistic givers6 with treatment condition 1 showed a greater likelihood 
of conditioning the transfer. This could be due to the fact that altruistic givers behave more 
reciprocally and either view conditionality as a contribution on the side of the recipient or 
                                                 
4 It is however difficult to say for sure whether unconditional transfers to those one knows are a result of higher 
trust or reluctance to impose costs on receivers one is close with. 
5 Givers were considered progressive when the very poor received more than they would have received through 
an equal distribution 
6 Giver were considered altruistic when they agreed with helping people who cannot do anything in return 
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prefer conditionality because they have a particularly strong exploitation aversion. The 
expectation of reciprocity might be lower for altruistic givers who decided for the other group, 
potentially because there was no interaction at any point of the experiment. This could 
explain why the coefficient for groups in SCT communities with treatment condition 2 is 
positive.  
 
Conditioning behavior among those who completely agreed that the community is 
responsible for the poor, differed by community status with SCT communities having a higher 
probability of conditioning. We can only speculate why this is the case. Transfers might be 
more conditioned when the giver is not seen as having direct and foremost responsibility to 
support those in need. In SCT communities, the government might now be regarded as the 
first provider with the community playing a supplementary role. In this case, community 
support might be more conditioned than in communities where community support is 
considered more essential for the survival of households. 
 
Giver characteristics also played a role, even though their respective effect differed at times 
across community status and treatment condition. Having a female giver reduces the 
probability of a conditional transfer, except for non-SCT groups with treatment condition 2. 
Very poor givers also seem less inclined to condition. This seems to support our assumption 
that those who have to bear the highest cost (of exclusion), are most concerned. The 
inclination to condition increases with age. Possibly older participants saw a greater need of 
ensuring that other households make the best choices with respect to the household and its 
members.  
 
Looking at the background characteristics of the recipients, we cannot detect a coherent 
trend by community status or treatment condition. There is little support for our initial 
hypothesis that recipients least able to comply with conditionality would be less conditioned. 
The only exception present individuals from non-SCT communities with treatment condition 1 
who decided to condition significantly fewer households whose household head was too old 
or sick to work.  
 
7. DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING 
Fewer transfers were conditioned during the group round of the experiment, where the group 
members had to reach a consensus on conditionality choices. Only 58% of all group 
transfers had a condition attached7 and no conditions were placed on any participant in 12 
out of the 50 experiments. Individual preferences and group outcomes diverge the most in 
SCT communities, where individuals’ preference for conditioning is about 14 percentage 
points higher than group outcomes (see table 5). This shows that decentralized decision-
making would lead to outcomes that are not fully compatible with decision-makers’ and 
individual preferences. 
 
Table 5: Percentage of group transfers being conditioned, by community status and treatment condition 
(data from the individual round in bracket) 
SCT communities Non-SCT communities 
Treatment 
condition 1 (intra) 
Treatment 
condition 2 (inter)
Treatment 
condition 1 (intra)
Treatment 
condition 2 (inter) 
45% (58%) 60% (75%) 78% (80%) 57% (64%) 
N 139 (1200) N 155 (1509) N 100 ( 753) N 100 ( 958) 
Source: Group allocation round (Experiment) 
                                                 
7 The difference between the individual and group choice on conditionality is statistically significant. 
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Why do individual preferences and group outcomes diverge? It could be due to the fact that 
participants were more reluctant to officially place conditionality on a fellow group member, 
that a person who did not believe in conditionality dominated the process, that no 
conditionality was the most common denominator or that the group process led to better 
information about the characteristics and behaviour of recipients and generated greater trust. 
We cannot see any evidence for people being ashamed to publicly place a condition on 
fellow group members. Otherwise we would have expected to generally see fewer conditions 
for treatment condition 1 where participants had to make decisions for members of their own 
group. This is not the case as the greatest number of transfers is conditioned in groups with 
treatment condition 1 (78%). We equally cannot say that fewer conditions are a result of 
someone dominating the process. 82% of all participants did not feel that the process was 
dominated by someone within the group and those who sensed the pressure by another 
group member were equally split across groups with no, few and many conditions.  
 
It is therefore likely that the group process either generated more quality information, 
lowering the need to condition or that there was more heterogeneity of opinions, turning no 
conditionality into the default position in case there was no initial group consensus. More 
exposure to SCT coupled with better information, more trust and / or a greater variety of 
opinions in the group process probably reduced the likelihood of transfers being conditioned 
in SCT communities. The fact that more than 90% of all members were satisfied with the 
group outcome and, hence, with the smaller number of conditions shows, however, that 
preference for more conditionality on an individual level was not very strong. It also makes us 
wonder whether more exposure and more information might also change the mind-set of 
policymakers.  
 
Table 6: Percentage of individuals choosing different conditions  
Individual choice Group choice
Education 60% 60%
Growth monitoring 22% 25%
Vaccinations 18% 11%
Community work 17% 31%
Training 11% 11%
Source: Individual and group allocation round (Experiment) 
 
Similar to the individual experiment choices, the majority of conditioned transfers only had 1 
condition (73%), followed by transfers that had 2 conditions (20%). Group decisions also 
prioritized education as a condition (table 6). However, in contrast to individual choices, 
vaccinations were ranked lower (3 percentage points) and community work a lot higher (14 
percentage points). The increasing importance of community work could be due to the fact 
that the group might have looked beyond the personal benefits of an individual and 
recognized advantages for the community.  
8. PREFERENCES FOR BEING CONDITIONED 
8.1 Preferences by beneficiaries & the general public 
During the beneficiary interview, beneficiaries were asked about their opinion of 
conditionality. We differentiated between beneficiaries who actually thought they were 
subject to conditionality in the social cash transfer program and those who answered the 
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question about conditionality hypothetically.8 Close to all beneficiaries (97%) who believed to 
be subject to conditionality self-assessed that the conditionality had empowered them (figure 
6), meaning that it had enabled them to make choices, access opportunities and have control 
of their life. Not a single beneficiary perceived the conditionality as disempowering.  
 
Figure 6: Perception of conditionality among beneficiaries with and without conditionality 
 
Source: Beneficiary survey 
 
This empowerment effect is also noted for those beneficiaries who did not believe to be 
subject to conditionality. The majority (92%) confirmed that conditionality would be 
empowering, with 8% stating that they would perceive conditionality as disempowering.  
 
Rural participants in the experiment were also asked about their perceptions of being 
conditioned. When asked hypothetically, rural participants answered in a similar way than 
beneficiaries, stating for the most part (90%) that conditionality would be empowering. About 
9% characterized it as disempowering. The outcome neither differs statistically across 
poverty groups nor across gender.  
 
This confirms earlier statements by rural respondents regarding their motives for not 
conditioning, that conditionality is not necessarily perceived as patronizing. 
8.2 Robustness check 
The perceived empowerment effects by beneficiaries and the rural communities might come 
as a surprise if we consider that conditionality limits beneficiaries’ choices, is linked with 
additional costs and could also be seen as a top-down control mechanism. We therefore 
carried out different robustness checks to ascertain that this empowerment effect was real. 
First of all, enumerators made sure that respondents referred to the conditionality as such 
and not the transfer when answering the question. Whether psychologically it is possible for 
people to neatly separate the two is difficult to say. We can however conclude that 
conditionality - at the very least - did not evoke any negative feeling.  
 
We also tried to get more information as to why respondents characterized conditionality as 
empowering. According to interviews with local stakeholders and beneficiaries themselves, 
beneficiaries appreciated the guidance of the conditionality in making choices. For them, 
greater flexibility did not necessarily translate into greater utility but greater insecurity as to 
what would be the best decision to make. Having no official rules, beneficiaries were worried 
about breaching informal rules and being arbitrarily excluded from the program over time. 
                                                 
8 We make this differentiation as the experiment in Monze, which intended to test the difference between 
unconditional and conditional cash transfers and originally differentiated between conditional and unconditional 
communities, was not implemented as planned.  
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Beneficiaries also appreciated conditionality as a negotiation tool in household decision-
making processes.9  
 
Thirdly, the experiment had built into it a check on the robustness of results because with 
treatment condition 1, givers also had the chance to condition themselves. If the positive 
connotation of conditionality was merely presented to please the enumerator and eventually 
the policy-maker in the survey, we would expect participants to mainly decide against 
conditionality for tokens allocated to themselves.  
 
70.5% of participants with treatment condition 1 conditioned tokens going to themselves. 
This either means that conditionality is indeed perceived as positive guidance, that 
conditionality is used as a commitment device or that givers felt guilty about giving tokens to 
themselves and therefore committed to do something in exchange. If guilt was the main 
driver, we would expect a higher proportion of very generous self-allocations to be 
conditioned. We observe, however, that more generous transfers of 5-20 tokens are less 
often conditioned (50% on average) than self-transfers of 1-4 tokens (78% on average). It 
therefore appears plausible that participants who did not want to enrich themselves through 
the experiment, either viewed conditionality as a positive reinforcement or regarded it as a 
useful tool for self-commitment.  
 
The conditionality effect is stronger among individuals from non-SCT communities with 85% 
of self-transfers being conditioned, compared to 62% from SCT communities. This could also 
mean that guidance was deemed more important in communities that had not experienced 
the rules as well as the effects of a SCT scheme. 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The unique feature of this study is that it provides an opportunity to listen and understand 
conditionality preferences of multiple stakeholders: those of central vis-à-vis decentralized 
decision-making structures, urban vs. rural individuals and of individuals conditioning vs. 
those being conditioned. Contrary to our expectations, conditionality has not only great 
appeal among policy-makers and richer voters but also among beneficiaries and the broader 
public. The majority of beneficiaries and rural respondents to an attitude survey experienced 
conditionality in reality or hypothetically as empowering. The experiment in rural communities 
confirmed this positive experience with conditionality as about 2/3 of participants voluntarily 
conditioned the transfers that they had allocated to themselves, despite the fact that it had 
financial implications. We could nevertheless assume that conditionality in the Zambian 
context mostly had a signaling effect of orienting beneficiaries’ behavior and letting them 
know that they were in conformity with what was expected of them. If conditionality had been 
more rigorously enforced, had not been in the interest of the conditioned person and/or had 
led to greater costs, opinions might have differed.  
 
The majority of urban respondents and the voters among them favored conditionality when 
placing themselves in the position of policy-makers. This was mainly because of the in-built 
possibility to control spending and ensure that recipients would take action to improve their 
situation. Transfers were conditioned in particular by rich, educated urban respondents 
without a preference for redistribution. Revealed preferences of rural respondents through 
the experiment matched the stated preferences by urban respondents. About 2/3 of all 
transfers were conditioned and conditioning was mainly a matter of trust and giver attitudes. 
Mistrust and a greater desire to control individuals’ behavior led to more conditioning. 
Progressive givers who viewed support as a responsibility of the government and family, saw 
less need for conditionality. More experience with SCT and transparency around all 
processes of a SCT program are likely to obviate the need for conditioning to some extent.   
 
                                                 
9 For more information about beneficiaries’ experience with conditionality, see Schüring (2010). 
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Groups conditioned on average fewer transfers, in particular those in SCT communities, 
deciding for their own members. Decentralized decision-making is therefore likely to produce 
slightly different outcomes than central decision-making. It is reasonable to assume that prior 
experience coupled with better information at the group level and greater trust might have led 
to fewer conditioned transfers. Relatively high satisfaction levels with the group outcome 
testify that individuals were still content with group choices for fewer conditions and that their 
preferences for conditionality are not static.  
 
As long as conditionality is not so rigorously enforced that it leads to greater tension, 
conditionality meets the interests of policy-makers, the general public and beneficiaries alike, 
exerting the necessary control for transfer givers and the guidance for transfer recipients. 
One example from Brazil illustrates that conditionality preferences might however change 
when policy-makers or voters are faced with the consequences of conditionality (de Janvry, 
Finan et al. 2009). The experiment has also demonstrated that conditionality preferences are 
neither homogeneous nor static: the influence of greater exposure to SCT is one example for 
this; the fact that individuals accepted group decisions with lower conditionality rates is 
another example. Time, experience and future consultations with those who are 
predominantly concerned will be indicative of whether conditionality remains a political 
priority. 
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